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Abstract: This paper highlights the policies and 
institutional setting of Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SME) development in Indonesia, followed by a discussion 
on the players in Islamic microfinance. Emphasis has been 
given to the potential role of Baitul Mal wa Tamwil (BMT, 
Islamic cooperative) as a strategic community-based micro 
lending initiative. The importance of Islamic microfinance 
initiatives as part of national program for the development 
of SMEs in Indonesia is also discussed. This paper argues 
that Islamic microfinance initiatives in Indonesia could 
represent an alternative source of finance for SMEs. The 
role of SMEs, especially after the Asian monetary crisis, 
was considered a safety valve for the national economic 
recovery both in enhancing economic growth as well as in 
reducing the unemployment rate. Credit distributed to 
SMEs has minimum risk and has sounder and better 
performance compared to larger enterprises. However, 
although having a significant role, SMEs actually have 
serious problems particularly as related to their capability in 
accessing formal financial institutions. This paper 
concludes by identifying the potential linkages between 
players in Islamic microfinance and highlights some critical 
points in their activities.  
Keywords: Small and medium entreprises, Islamic 
microfinance, baitul mal wa tamwil. 
 
Introduction 
The role of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), especially after 
the Asian monetary crisis in late 1990s, was considered a safety valve 
for the national economic recovery both in enhancing economic 
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growth as well as in reducing the unemployment rate. During 2000 – 
2011, the value creation of SME sectors increased significantly while 
large enterprises decreased. SMEs also contributed about 87.9 % to the 
Indonesian Gross Domestic Product in 2011 compared to the 
contribution of large business enterprises. SME sectors could absorb 
about 98 million workers (99.4% of the labor force) and provide about 
43.8% of commodity needs and national services.1 The Bank of 
Indonesia also acknowledged that credit distributed to SMEs has 
minimum risk and has sounder and better performance compared to 
larger enterprises.2 In concurrence with the Bank of Indonesia, other 
studies also revealed that the Indonesian economy could not depend 
mostly on larger enterprises and SMEs were more resilient to the crisis 
compared to larger businesses.3However, instead of having a 
significant role, SMEs actually have serious problems particularly as 
related to their capability in accessing formal financial institutions. It is 
in this context that this paper will identify and explore the emergence 
of Islamic microfinance initiatives that could represent an alternative 
source of finance for Small and Medium Enterprises.  
This paper highlights the policies and institutional setting of SME 
development in Indonesia, followed by a discussion on the players in 
Islamic microfinance. Emphasis has been given to the potential role of 
baitul mal wa tamwil (BMT; literally “House of Funds and Finance”; 
terminologically “Islamic cooperative”) as a strategic community-based 
micro lending initiative. The importance of Islamic microfinance 
initiatives as part of national program for the development of SMEs in 
Indonesia is also discussed. This paper concludes by identifying the 
potential linkages between players in Islamic microfinance and 
highlights some critical points in their activities.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1 The Bank of Indonesia, “Credit Crunch in Indonesia After the Crisis: The Facts, 
Causal Factors and Policy Implications,” Internal discussion paper published by 
Department of Economy and Monetary Policy, the Bank of Indonesia (2001). 
2 Ibid.  
3 See for instance Tambunan, Manggara. “Melangkah ke Depan Bersama UKM,” 
Paper presented at Economic Debate ESEI, Jakarta, September 15-16 (2004). 
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Overview of Policies on Small Business Development 
Development of SMEs in Indonesia 
SMEs have played a significant role in Indonesia‟s economy for 
many decades and there are numerous reasons for this.  First, there is a 
high proportion of SMEs in the economy, as both the number of 
enterprises and the economic output is high. According to the Central 
Bureau of Statistics, since 1998 Indonesia has had more than 37 
million SME accounts, which contributed 60% to the Gross National 
Product (GNP) and constituted more than 95% of the total number of 
enterprises in the country.4 Second, SMEs are a major source of 
employment. For example, Shujiro Urata of the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) and Timberg noted that in recent years 
the number of employees involved in SMEs exceeded 90% of the total 
workforce.5 This figure is expected to grow due to an accelerating rate 
of new SMEs being formed and also the expansion of existing 
enterprises.6 
SME development in Indonesia has been connected to some 
contentious issues, such as the „affirmative action‟ policies of fostering 
indigenous entrepreneurs (mostly Muslims) and various poverty 
eradication programs. Historically, there were two major initiatives 
related to affirmative action: the Benteng (Bastion) program in the 
1950s, and asas pemerataan („even distribution principle‟) of Soeharto‟s 
New Order period.7 The Benteng program was intended to promote 
the dominance of small-scale indigenous entrepreneurs‟ in the import 
sector and it was first implemented by the Natsir cabinet (September 
                                                          
4 Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Bureau of Statistics), Profile of Establishment with Legal 
Entity, (Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2000), Table (A) and after. See also, Swasono, Sri 
Edi,‟ Kedaulatan Rakyat, August 5, 2002, „Prospek dan Perkembangan Perekonomian 
Rakyat: Antara Kedaulatan Rakyat dan Kedaulatan Pasar‟. 
5 “Perbankan Nasional Anaktirikan Usaha Kecil Menengah,” Kompas, July, 25 2002.  
Also Thomas Timberg,  “Strategy of Financing Small and Medium Enterprises in A 
New Economic Environment,” (Paper presented at the conference on The Indonesian 
Economic Recovery in Changing Environment, held by Faculty of Economics, 
University of Indonesia on its 50th anniversary, Jakarta, 4-5 October, 2000). See also 
Timberg, “Risk Management; Islamic Financial Policies Islamic banking and Its 
Potential Impact,” An International Conference on Best Practice (2006). 
6 Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Bureau of Statistics), Profile of Establishment with Legal 
Entity (Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2006). 
7 Richard Robison,  The Rise of Capital (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 44-46. 
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1950-March 1951) but was most enthusiastically conducted by Ishaq 
Tjokrohadisoerjo, the Minister of Economic Affairs in the Ali 
Sastroamidjojo cabinet (August 1953-November 1954). However, the 
program failed due to insufficient regulation and abuse of the licensing 
system.8 Many Benteng enterprises did not use the import licenses 
themselves, but rather sold them to established importers, most of 
which were Chinese-controlled. Often these arrangements became 
known as „Ali Baba‟ companies. „Ali‟ (a reference to a pribumi or 
„indigenous‟ Muslim) obtained the license through the Benteng 
program while „Baba‟ (the Chinese entrepreneur) operated the business 
and took most of the profits, thus defeating the purpose of enhancing 
the economic power of Muslim businesspeople.9 The Benteng 
program was eventually scrapped by the Djuanda cabinet in 1957.10 
Soeharto launched his own version of an affirmative action policy 
in the mid-1970s. Following the Malari riot on 15 January 1974, which 
was sparked by, among other things, a resentment towards non-
„indigenous‟ economic domination, significant changes in policy were 
adopted in the Garis Besar Haluan Negara (GBHN, Broad Outlines of 
State Policy) in 1978.11 The GBHN stated that pemerataan (equality) was 
to become a guiding principle in development policy, alongside high 
economic growth and national stability. At least seven special 
programs in the form of Instruksi Presiden (Inpres, Presidential 
Instructions), were initiated as a means to bring about more equitable 
wealth distribution. These distribution programs covered a wide range 
of areas, including rural development, affordable public health, 
education, reforestation and public works.12 
To alleviate poverty, Soeharto introduced various programs and 
credit schemes, including: (1) Inpres Desa Tertinggal (IDT), the 
                                                          
8 David L. Bevan, Paul Collier and Jan W. Gunning, The Political Economy of Poverty, 
Equity and   Growth Nigeria and Indonesia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 
221. 
9 Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital, p. 46. 
10 Ibid.   
11 Shortly, after the incident of  Malari some significant affirmative policies have been 
taken place. Unfortunately, these policies apparently only political in nature, without 
any firm and sincere implementation afterwards. For more details refer  Business 
News, No. 1, Jan/Feb. (1974), pp. 16-18. 
12 Surbakti, Ramlan, ”Formal Political Institutions,” in Richard W. Baker, et.al., (eds), 
Indonesia the Challenge of Change (Singapore : ISEAS, 1999), pp. 73-74. 
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presidential decree to alleviate backward villages, (2) the establishment 
small industry centers, Lingkungan Industri Kecil (LIK); and (3) 
introducing various subsidized credit schemes. Soeharto also urged 
state enterprises, Badan Usaha Milik Negara (BUMN), to assist small-
scale business firms through a bapak angkat (foster parent) mechanism, 
and obliged BUMN to promote sub-contacting schemes with small-
scale industries. The government also recommended that large 
enterprises sell shares to cooperatives, including the industrial 
cooperatives (both Koperasi Industri Kecil and Koperasi Industri 
Kerajinan Rakyat) to improve their capital base. Lastly, the New Order 
obliged all state and private banks to allocate 20% of their portfolio to 
small business enterprises.13 
Institutional Setting of Small Business and Microfinance in 
Indonesia 
Philosophy of Islamic Microfinance 
The discussion on Islamic banking and microfinance will begin by 
identifying the philosophical background for the involvement of 
Islamic financial institutions in microfinance, their institutional settings 
and strategies for promoting small and micro enterprises. Although the 
main focus of Islamic banking is economic and financial 
intermediation, the system can only be fully comprehended in the 
context of social justice, equitable distribution concepts, and ethics. 
The individual and collective good, such as respect for property rights, 
sharing the risk and rewards, the sanctity of contracts and concern for 
the lower-income groups in society are also among the main principles 
underlying the Islamic banking system. Islamic small and microfinance 
programs share these principles with Islamic banks. As Dhumale and 
Sapcanin noted, „They [Islamic banks and microfinance] may 
complement each other in both ideological and practical terms‟.14 
In line with this philosophy, most Islamic commercial and rural 
banks in Indonesia include in their formal objectives the 
empowerment of small and medium enterprises. Bank Muamalat 
Indonesia (BMI), for instance, states in its corporate mission statement 
                                                          
13 Marisol Ravicz, Searching for Sustainable Microfinance: A Review of Five Indonesian Initiatives 
(Development Economics Research Group, World Bank working paper (1996), pp. 4-
6. 
14 Rahul Dhumale and Amela Sapcanin, An Application of Islamic Banking Principles to 
Microfinance, Technical Note (Washington: World Bank, n.d), p. 1. 
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that it is „committed to provide the best services according to the 
government policies and sharī‘ah (Islamic law). This mission is 
implemented by identifying the needs of our clients and offering them 
various kinds of products and services, and is focused on promoting 
small and medium scale businesses‟.15 The same sentiment had been 
enunciated by Rizqullah, the former head of BNI-46‟s Islamic banking 
division, stating that „BNI-Sharī„ah will be committed 100% to small 
and micro enterprises‟.16 To him, SME is low risk and is more crisis 
resilient than corporate lending. During its grand opening ceremony, 
the Islamic branch of Bank Danamon promised to dedicate 80% of its 
lending to small and medium enterprises.17 Some Islamic banks and 
Islamic units in conventional banks even incorporated the 
commitment toward small and medium finance into their motto. Bank 
Syariah Mandiri (BSM), for example, has the slogan of „lebih adil dan 
menenteramkan‟ (more just and reassuring).18  
From the marketing point of view, the idea of small and medium 
enterprises is also a saleable theme. According to Hermawan Kertajaya 
of Mark Plus Marketing Consultancy, there are two segments in the 
Islamic banking customer base: the „emotional market‟ and the 
„rational market‟.19 The emotional market is driven mainly by a spirit to 
implement the Islamic principles in financial affairs as well as a 
motivation to foster small and medium enterprises. On the other hand, 
the rational market is the group that is primarily driven by a desire for 
better service and higher returns. 
Categorization and Players in SMEs 
In general, relations between SMEs and financial institutions can 
be categorized as either formal or informal. Formal financial 
institutions take two forms: bank and non-bank. According to the 
Banking Act No. 10/1998, only Bank Umum (commercial banks) and 
Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (rural banks) are classed as „banks‟. Non-bank 
formal financial institutions include various types of Lembaga Dana 
Kredit Pedesaan (LDKP, village-based institutions for small enterprise 
                                                          
15 BMI, Annual Report, 1996 and 2006. 
16 Republika, June 24, 2002. 
17 Kompas, June 29, 2002. 
18 BSM, Annual Report, 2000 and 2006. 
19 BMI, Annual Report, 2000 and 2006. 
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financing) and cooperatives. Informal financial institutions cover 
almost unlimited forms of saving-lending initiatives in society, such as 
Kelompok Swadaya Masyarakat (KSM, people‟s self-help groups), 
Kelompok Simpan Pinjam (KSP, saving and credit groups), Lembaga 
Swadaya Masyarakat (NGOs, non-governmental organizations) and 
KSM-based BMT. The categorization of Small and Micro Financial 
Institutions in Indonesia is summarized in table 1. 
Table 1: Categorization of Small and Micro Financial Institutions in 
Indonesia 
                        Formal                      Informal 
Bank 
Commercial Bank  
Rural Bank  
Non-Bank 
LDKP  
Co-operative 
KSM  
LSM  
BMT 
Source : Antonio, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Melbourne, 2004. 
In addition to those mentioned above, Yusoff stated that micro 
credit programmes are in fact run by various institutions, including 
government-related institutions which act as poverty reduction agents, 
NGOs – lending as a primary or side programme, not-for-profit 
private institutions, and commercial institutions.20 Table 2 shows a 
summary of four different types of micro credit operators. 
Table 2: Examples of Micro Credit Operators 
Classification Institution 
Government-related 
agencies 
BRI (Indonesia), AIM, BAAC (Thailand) 
NGO Tau Yew Mai (Vietnam), Diocesan 
Development Services (Africa) 
Not-for profit 
institutions 
Grameen Bank, Rural Credit and 
Cooperative Foundation (China), BancoSol 
(Bolivia) 
Commercial Bank Shinta Daya (Indonesia), Bank 
Dagang (Indonesia) 
Source : Yusoff et al., “A Study on the Possibility of Mosque Institution.”  
                                                          
20 Asry Yusoff et al., “A Study on the Possibility of Mosque Institution Running a 
Micro-Credit Programme Based on the Grameen Bank Group Lending Model: The 
Case of Mosque Institution in Kelantan, Malaysia,” (Paper Presented on the 6th 
International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance in Jakarta, 21-24 
November 2005).  
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Players in Islamic small and microfinance can be classified into 
several categories based on their credit and capital size and source of 
funds (see table 3). Based on capital and credit size, there are Islamic 
commercial banks (ICBs), Bank Perkreditan Rakyat Syariah (BPRS, 
Islamic rural banks) and BMT. Among ICBs we also find private and 
state-owned banks as well as Islamic branches of conventional banks. 
Both ICBs and BPRS are heavily regulated by the Bank of Indonesia, 
while BMT are monitored by the Lembaga Pengembang Swadaya 
Masyarakat (LPSM or Institute for the Development of Self-Help 
Groups).  
Table 3: Islamic Banks and Finance Companies in Indonesia According to 
Their Size of Capital and Credit Limit 
Type of Islamic Bank Minimum Capital Size of Credit per 
customer21 
ICB Rp.1 trillion ( for new 
license) 
Rp. 100 million and 
higher 
 
BPRS  
 
Rp 500 million– Rp. 
2 billion 
 
Rp. 5 – 100 million 
 
BMT 
 
Rp. 10 – 100 million 
 
Rp. 100.000 to Rp. 
10 million 
Players in Islamic Microfinance 
One of the most important institutions in Islamic small and 
microfinance is the BMT. The term BMT originated from the treasury 
system at the time of the Prophet Muh }ammad, which was called Bayt 
al-Māl. Bayt al-Māl, served as the treasury for national budgeting as well 
as maintaining stability of money supply. The Bayt al-Māl also 
functioned as a payment centre for the government in dealing with 
local and international agencies and individuals. The practice of Bayt al-
Māl developed significantly during the time of the second caliph, 
`Umar bin Khat}t }āb. During his period (624-634 AD) branches of the 
Bayt al-Māl were set up in every capital city of the caliphate to collect 
taxes, the spoils of wars and administrative fees, as well as to raise 
                                                          
21 The maximum lending limit of Islamic banks is subject to their size of capital (legal 
lending limit). 
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charitable funds. They also financed infrastructure and paid the wages 
and salaries of state officers.22 
Different from the original concept of Bayt al-Māl, the main 
objective of BMTs is to provide an Islamic alternative to micro 
enterprises that for decades have been the victims of moneylenders. 
Most micro entrepreneurs lack access to formal banking institutions, 
conventional and Islamic alike. The first initiative of BMT in Indonesia 
was pioneered by Islamic NGO activists, such as Zainal Muttaqien, 
Istar Abadi, Iwan Kusuma Hamdan, Aries Mufti, Rizal Kusumanegara 
and Syafii Antonio in 1992.23 As the first BMT, Bina Insan Kamil 
(BIK) proved that micro lending could be carried out profitably and in 
a sustainable form. With capital of Rp. 4.7 million (equal to US$ 1,880 
at that time), BIK was successful in mobilizing funds and channeling 
credit into micro enterprises in the Eastern region of Jakarta. Within 
30 months of operation BIK managed to collect more than Rp. 400 
million in deposits through the schemes of mud}ārabah deposits and 
wadī‘ah savings.24 Following the success of BIK, other BMT were 
established in other parts of Jakarta and West Java. By the end of 1992 
there were more than 30 BMTs throughout Indonesia.25 
Interested in the strategic role of the BMT, Amin Aziz26 of Ikatan 
Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI, the Indonesian Association of 
Muslim Intellectuals) invited BIK managers to work closely with other 
prospective BMT groups and develop a national BMT system. 
However, BIK managers responded to the invitation reluctantly. The 
main reason for this unenthusiastic response was to avoid the use of 
BMTs as a political maneuver on the part of Azis (at that time, Azis 
was a close aide to former President Habibie and senior member of 
ICMI). As a result, BIK group established their own BMT linkages 
                                                          
22 Hasanuz Zaman, SM., Economic Functions of an Islamic State; The Early Experience, 2nd 
edition (Karachi: The Islamic Foundation, 1991). 
23 Personal interview with Aries Mufti, Jakarta, 17 May 2007. 
24 Mud}ārabah is a profit sharing mode of financing but the scheme can also be used to 
generate funding from the public in various types of saving and deposits. Wadī‘ah is a 
trust deposit widely used in Islamic bank as a current account.  
25 Personal interview with Rizal Muganegara, Director of BIK, Jakarta, 18 May 2007. 
26 Amin Aziz is one of the most important figures in the establishment of BMI. He is a 
senior member of central Board of MUI, and Muhammadiyah Economic Committee, 
and he used to be a senior member of PAN, a political party led by Amien Rais. 
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named Pusat Penelitian dan Pengembangan Usaha Kecil (P3UK, the 
Centre for Research and Development of Small Business). As an 
alternative, Aziz formed Pusat Inkubasi Bisnis Usaha Kecil (PINBUK, 
Centre for Small Business Incubation) to provide an umbrella group 
for further BMT development in Indonesia. PINBUK initially was a 
task force of YINBUK (Yayasan Inkubasi Busnis Usaha Kecil, 
Foundation for Small Business Incubation) established jointly on 13 
March, 1996, by ICMI, BMI and MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 
Indonesian Ulama Council).27 Despite accusations that Aziz was 
politicizing BMTs, the BMT movement gained momentum under his 
leadership and was declared a national program by President Soeharto 
on 7 December 1995.  
With the support of Habibie from ICMI, Zainul Baharnoor from 
BMI and Hasan Basri from MUI, as well as the blessing of Soeharto, 
BMTs spread into cities and regions across Indonesia. PINBUK 
reported that by the end of 2002, there were more than 2,500 BMT 
units in operation. However, the widespread proliferation of BMTs 
cannot be credited to PINBUK alone. In fact, it is a result of scattered 
but complementary actions of Islamic micro finance centers such as 
P3UK, FES (Forum Ekonomi Syariah) Griya Arafa, and Amanah 
Ummat Foundation.28 
Other NGOs that are actively involved in developing BMTs in 
Indonesia at the moment are the BMT Centre of Dompet Dhuafa and 
Microfin Indonesia.29 The BMT Centre was established in 14 June 
2005 but now has more than 100 BMTs member, mostly in the form 
of cooperatives. Total assets of the BMT Center‟s members are more 
than Rp. 251 billion, with 1,626 employees. The BMT Center as a 
coordinating body aims to develop networks among members and 
develop the potential of BMTs. The institution remains non-
governmental, professional, and transparent and is overseen by 
                                                          
27 Agus Sumarno, “Skenario Pengembangan Jaringan Ekonomi Umat; Kaitannya BMT 
dan Sektor Riel,” Baihaqi Abd Majid and Saifuddin A. Rasyid, (eds), Paradigma Baru 
Ekonomi Kerakyatan Sistim Syariah (Jakarta: Pinbuk, 2000), p. 242. 
28 Chamsiah Djamal, “Pengalaman BMT Dalam Mengentaskan Kemiskinan Umat,” in 
Paradigma Baru Ekonomi Kerakyatan Sistim Syariah, in Ibid., p. 276. 
29 Ersa Tri Wahyuni, “The Accountability of Islamic Microfinance Institutions: 
Evidence From Indonesia,” in the Proceeding of First International Islamic 
Conference on Inclusive Islamic Financial Sector Development, p. 532 and onwards 
(Brunei Darussalam: University of Brunei Darussalam April, 17-19, 2007). 
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independent people who are not BMT executive staff. The BMT 
Center initiative came from Dompet Dhuafa and is fully supported by 
a number of BMTs, mostly in Jakarta and Central Java. Currently the 
Centre cooperates with PT Permodalan National Madani (PT PNM), a 
state-owned enterprise that distributes funding of up to Rp. 15 billion 
to eligible BMTs. Members of the BMT Center need to submit their 
financial statement to meet the eligibility criteria in order to become a 
member or receive capital funding.  
Similar to the BMT Centre is Microfin Indonesia. Established in 
2005, Microfin Indonesia has 700 BMT partners. The cooperation 
varies from channeling funds, training for establishment, legal 
assistance and providing management consultancy. Microfin Indonesia 
has several branches mostly in big cities in Java. They have strong 
relations with Baitul Mal Muamalat (BMM, a Corporate Social 
Responsibility arm of BMI), as many of the founders of Microfin also 
come from BMM. Many BMT development programs from BMM are 
carried out by Microfin Indonesia. A recent program involved 107 
BMTs from Java and Lampung, which joined a program that includes 
funding assistance, training and IT development support. Microfin also 
cooperates closely with the Ministry of Cooperatives and Small to 
Medium Enterprises. In 2003 and 2004, they distributed funding grants 
from the Ministry to 127 BMTs.30 
The emergence of BMTs has had a significant impact on the 
development of Islamic financing in Indonesia. BMTs can use Islamic 
commercial and rural banks as their channeling networks particularly in 
areas where BPRS or commercial banks are absent. However, from a 
legal standpoint, the establishment of BMTs is quite problematic 
because they have no formal linkage to the national monetary system 
and are neither controlled by the Bank of Indonesia nor by the 
Ministry of Finance. Most BMTs were established initially as self-help 
groups or in the form of foundations. The crucial element of this 
informal status is with the funding activities of BMTs. They mobilize 
savings and deposits from the community without any obligation to 
produce formal regular monthly reports either to the public or to a 
supervisory body. The accountability of BMTs in many respects 
depends on the sincerity and good intentions of the management (see 
table 1-4). 
                                                          
30 Ibid. 
 
 
 
Muhammad Syafii Antonio 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 05, Number 02, December 2011 
324 
Apart from the issue of legal concerns, the BMTs have had the 
chance to cover the needs of the poor or low-income members of 
society. As stated by Ascarya and Sanrego,31 figures show that BMTs, 
as part of other microfinance institutions, fit in with the nature and the 
needs of poor Indonesian people. BMTs also do not require customers 
to have any licenses or permits to run their businesses and that makes 
BMTs more suited to the poor. 
Driven by this phenomenon, almost all Islamic centers for 
development of micro enterprises such as PINBUK, P3UK, the BMT 
Centre of Dompet Dhuafa, Microfin Indonesia and Amanah Ummat 
Foundation have urged BMTs to create a formal legal entity. The most 
advisable form is that of a cooperative or self-help group with special 
„mother‟ institutions that provide guidance and monitoring, widely 
known as LPSM. With this new legal framework, BMTs represent one 
of the most appropriate lending institutions for addressing entrenched 
poverty in villages through the issuing of micro-credit on a commercial 
basis without violating the Islamic principles of transaction. 
Table 4: Institutional and Infrastructure Conditions of Microfinance 
(Comparing BPR, BRI Units and BMT) 
Aspect BPR & BRI Unit Cooperative Other MF 
Institutions 
Regulation Banking Law Cooperative Law N/A 
Regulator Bank of Indonesia Ministry of 
Cooperative & 
SMEs 
N/A 
Supervision Bank of Indonesia N/A N/A 
Insurance Government N/A N/A 
Liquidity Bank of Indonesia N/A N/A 
Rating Bank of Indonesia – 
Soundness Rate 
Ministry of 
Cooperation & 
SMEs 
N/A 
                                                          
31 Ascarya and Yulizar D. Sanrego, “Redefining Micro, Small and Medium  Enterprises 
Classification and the Potency of Baytul Maal wa Tamwil Intermediary Institutions in 
Indonesia,” in Syed Salman Syed Ali (ed.), Proceedings of First International Islamic 
Conference on Inclusive Islamic Financial Sector Development, Volume II (Brunei Darussalam: 
University of Brunei Drussalam, 17-19 2007), pp. 552-578. 
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Aspect BPR & BRI Unit Cooperative Other MF 
Institutions 
Association Perbarindo-
Asbisindo 
Main 
Cooperative 
Centre 
PINBUK/Credit 
Union 
Source : Didin Wahyudin, “Key Success Factors In Micro Financing,” (Paper 
presented at Panel Discussion Microfinance Revolution: Future Perspective 
for Indonesian Market, Jakarta, 7 Dec, 2004). 
 
Gebrekidan provides a clear feature of microfinance institutions 
(MFIs).32 He stated that MFIs in relation to other financial 
intermediaries have a special role and distinguishing features, as 
follows: (1) The primary objective of MFIs is to address the credit 
needs of those who are willing and ready to reduce their chronic 
poverty by engaging in farming and small scale production and service 
activities;33 (2) Beside provision of credit facilities, MFIs render 
managerial, marketing, technical and administrative advice to 
borrowers, by reaching borrowers at their place of work; (3) MFIs do 
not require collateral to extend credit in cash or in kind to peasant 
farmers and small entrepreneurs. Instead of peer group-leading 
schemes, character based loans and the promise of subsequent loans 
are the main motivations for repayment;34 (4) Saving requirements are 
introduced as a compulsory feature of lending activity and this saving 
requirement seems to serve as a motivator for repayment of loans 
since borrowers choose to repay the loan rather than losing the 
amount they saved.35 
 
 
                                                          
32 Gebrekidan, A., “The impact of micro financing institutions on the livelihood of the 
rural poor,” Seminar Series (Nazareth, Ethiopia: Department of Business Management, 
Adama University, 2006). 
33 Getahun Tafesse, “The PRSP initiative: implications to Ethiopia, United Nations. 
Economic Commission for Africa, UN,” (Paper presented at ECA Workshop and 
training course on public intervention for poverty reduction and the PRSP in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, 31 July- 2 August 2001). 
34 Marguerite Robinson, The Microfinance Revolution: Sustainable finance for the poor 
(Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2001). 
35 Tafesse, The PRSP initiative. 
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Islamic Microfinance Programs 
As explained in the previous sections, the Indonesian government 
has, from time to time, initiated several programs and subsidized credit 
schemes for small and micro enterprises through various state 
departments and agencies. Shortly after the Asian monetary crisis in 
late 1990s, the government also promoted a number of subsidized 
credit schemes of programmed credit.36 At the same time ICBs and 
BPRS could also participate in other programs as long as they did not 
violate Islamic principles. For instance, in 1998, BMI succeeded in 
launching a profit-sharing based, subsidized credit program named 
KKPA as a credit facility for cooperative members. The credit ceiling 
agreed by the Bank of Indonesia and the Ministry of Finance reached 
the amount of Rp. 30.7 billion.37 As a pilot project, this credit scheme 
has been distributed in coordination with 16 cooperatives and BMT in 
West Java, Central Java, and East Java. In November 1998 BMI also 
obtained approval from the Central Bank to disseminate the loans on a 
profit sharing basis for cooperatives (KKOP, Kredit Kepada Koperasi) 
and the amount of credit for the first stage was Rp. 10 billion. Another 
form of synergy between the Central Bank and ICBs is the project to 
heighten incomes for small farmers through the Farmer Enterprise 
Credit scheme. BMI proposed the concept of al-wakālah (mandate to 
perform) as the basis for credit distribution. The central bank 
responded positively by granting Rp. 27 billion for the first stage.38  
Starting from 1997, BMI has also been trusted by Ministry of 
Cooperatives to carry out Proyek Peningkatan Kemandirian Rakyat 
(P2KER, the People‟s Economic Empowerment Project).39 This 
project was implemented in cooperation with four partners; Rābithat 
al-Ma‟āhid al-Islāmi >yah (RMI, a federation of NU-based traditional 
Islamic boarding schools or pesantren), Induk Koperasi Pondok 
Pesantren (Inkopontren, the Central Board of the Traditional Islamic 
Boarding Schools‟ Co-operatives), PINBUK and Pusat Pengkajian 
                                                          
36 Zainul Arifin,  Memahami Bank Syariah, Lingkup Peluang Tantangan dan Prospek, p. 97. 
37 BMI Annual Report, 1998 and 2006. 
38 Ibid. 
39 For more information regarding the P2KER program see “Panduan Unit Simpan 
Pinjam Syariah, Proyek Peningkatan Kemandirian Ekonomi Rakyat (P2KER),” 
(Unpublished booklet,  Jakarta: Ministry of Cooperatives and Bank Muamalat, 
1997/1998).  
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Masyarakat dan Pesantren (P3M, Centre for Study of pesantren and 
society; it is a think-tank institute with close ties to NU). The main 
objective of this project is to accelerate the development of Unit 
Simpan Pinjam (USP, Islamic savings and lending units) at pesantren in 
Indonesia. By the beginning of 1999, more than 1,500 Islamic savings 
and lending units had been established at pesantren in 15 provinces. The 
project covers training programs for more than 3,000 management and 
executive officers and 160 staff of USP. Other activities include 
channelling of the working capital, in the amount of Rp. 16.68 billion, 
to the USP units as well as conducting monitoring programs and 
supervision of the distribution of the funds.40 
Other efforts in promoting small and micro financing include 
strategic alliances with various local and international agencies and 
associations. Since 1996, BMI was again entrusted by a Kuwaiti-based 
NGO, the International Development Fund (IDF),41 to coordinate a 
specific program for small and micro enterprise development in 
selected provinces of Indonesia. The pilot project was carried out in 
the provinces of Lombok and Central Java. In the first stage, more 
than Rp. 286 million of IDF funds was allocated to 1,063 members of 
cooperatives and street vendors. BPRS Margi Rizki in Yogyakarta and 
BPRS Patuh Beramal in Mataram, Lombok, were chosen as the 
affiliate parties for the project.42 
In 2007 BMM launched the KUM3 program (Komunitas Usaha 
Mikro Mustahik Muamalat, the Muamalat Micro Enterprises 
Community). With KUM3, BMM aimed to empower at least 11,000 
micro enterprises by channelling Rp. 22 billion until the end of 2007.43 
The establishment of BMM also served as a clear departure and 
separation of charity-based small and micro finance (SMF) with funds 
coming from zakāh (an Islamic tax for charity), and other forms of 
charity, from commercial-based SMF that used ordinary savings and 
deposits at market rates to finance the fund.  
Along with those aforementioned initiatives, the government also 
launched economic package to stimulate small and micro finance. The 
                                                          
40 BMI, Annual Report, 1998, pp. 37-38, and see also BMI Annual Report 2006. 
41 The signing ceremony took place on December 6, 1996. 
42 BMI, Annual Report, 1997, pp. 36-37. 
43 http://satudunia.oneworld.net/article/view/150036/1/, last accessed on September 
4, 2007. 
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most appreciated national initiative to foster the development of small 
and micro finance in Indonesia is the obligation to have a minimum 
percentage of Kredit Usaha Kecil (KUK, Credit for Small Business) in 
credit portfolios. The initiative began in 1990 as a political-economic 
consequence of the reduction of the Bank of Indonesia‟s ability to 
subsidize a wide range of credits. According to the government‟s 
Decree No. 29/Jan/1990, all banks were required to extend at least 
20% of their total credit portfolio to small enterprises.44 The main 
objective of this policy was to ensure a sufficient supply of funds 
would be channeled to small and micro enterprises group. 
Potential Networking and Linkage between Islamic Financial 
Institutions 
Another strategic program in promoting small and microfinance in 
Indonesia is the symbiotic relationship between different types of 
Islamic financial institutions (IFIs). The type of cooperation among 
IFIs consists of one out of at least five forms: equity placement, 
deposit placement, syndicated financing, credit channelling and 
extending credit to BPRSs or BMTs. The most common of these five 
practices are the first two.  With these joint efforts, BPRSs and BMTs 
can access fresh funds from ICBs, hence strengthening their liquidity. 
At the same time they can also provide new investment ventures for 
ICBs that generate new income and extend the Islamic banks service 
networks. Another benefit of cooperation is to reduce the monitoring 
and supervisory costs of ICBs, particularly in locations where they do 
not have branches or representatives. The monitoring function is more 
economical if it is delegated to BPRS or BMT. The linkages and 
networks among Islamic financial institutions are depicted in table 5. 
In the centre of the network (figure 1-1) are ICBs. ICBs are 
surrounded by BPRSs, and these in turn are at the centre of the BMT‟s 
orbit. These Islamic financial institutions obtain funds mainly from 
public depositors at commercial rates, and occasionally from various 
government and non-governmental organizations. Among government 
agencies actively involved in small business support are the Bank of 
Indonesia (Central Bank), the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of 
Cooperatives, the National Planning Board for Development, the 
Ministry of Industry and International Trade, and the Ministry of 
Manpower and Transmigration. Under the Ministry of Finance, three 
                                                          
44 Bank Indonesia, Sejarah Peranan Bank Indonesia Dalam Pengembangan Usaha Kecil, p. 77. 
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state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are playing strategic roles in promoting 
small and micro enterprises: Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), Permodalan 
Nasional Madani (PNM), and Bank Tabungan Negara (BTN). 
Some Critical Points of Islamic Microfinance Initiatives 
Having the nature of microfinance, it is clear that Islamic 
microfinance institutions could become an engine to accelerate SME 
businesses. However, a close investigation of the practices of Islamic 
small and micro financial institutions reveals several problems. Chief 
among these is the lack of coordination between ICBs and various 
government agencies and NGOs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In terms of cooperation, almost every ICB is looking for a healthy 
and sound BPRS with which it can form a strategic alliance. In many 
cases, BMI and Bank Syariah Mandiri (BSM) are competing against 
Table 5: Linkages of Islamic Small and Micro Finances in Indonesia 
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each other in the search for sound and attractive BPRSs and BMTs. 
The BPRSs and BMTs also find themselves in a similarly competitive 
system in which they seek the most favourable ICB partners and 
conditions. The most obvious consequence of this – a survival of the 
fittest condition – is the lack of attention to small and financially 
insecure BPRS and BMTs. In fact this group is the one that needs the 
most attention and assistance.  
Regarding technical aspects, almost all of the prevailing Islamic 
banks are applying corporate banking approaches to deal with small 
and micro enterprises. According to Mukhamad Yazid of Tazkia 
Research Centre and many other critics45 this approach constitutes one 
of the most fatal errors perpetrated by Islamic commercial and rural 
banks in Indonesia. The average cost to handle a big corporation is 
almost the same as tackling a small credit unit, although the latter has 
much less margin and profitability. As a consequence, if the ICB and 
BPRS do not restructure their approach to suit small and micro 
enterprises, the SMEs will constitute a burden and dealing with them 
will require a high cost of transaction.46 
The other serious challenge faced by the Islamic banking industry 
in serving small and micro enterprises is the limitation on the size of its 
network and number of branches. Until the third quarter of 2011, 
there were only 11 fully-fledged Islamic banks and 24 conventional 
banks with Islamic branches. The total number of offices of ICBs is 
1430, including head offices, main branches, sub-branches, Shariah 
service units and cash units.47 This constitutes very low penetration 
compared to the 378 conventional bank offices. At the rural banking 
level, a report by the Bank of Indonesia stated that Indonesia has 157 
Islamic rural banks compared to 8,950 units of conventional rural 
banks.48  
The limited numbers of Islamic bank offices is a serious obstacle 
for small and micro enterprises in remote areas and small villages to 
                                                          
45 Personal interview Jakarta, July 12, 2007 
46 Personal interview with Budi Wicakseno, the Marketing Director of BMI, May, 13, 
2007. 
47 The Bank of Indonesia, Islamic Banking Statistics (Jakarta: Islamic Banking 
Directorate, July 2007). 
48 http://www.bi.go.id/biweb/Html/SekiTxt/T3x101.txt, retrieved on September 15, 
2007. 
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access Islamic finance. Some initiatives, however, have been taken by 
the Bank of Indonesia since 2006, including introducing an Office 
Channeling (OC) program, by which a conventional branch might 
introduce Islamic banking services on basic funding services such as 
receiving deposits and providing client information. In 2007, the Bank 
of Indonesia began gradually allowing the OC to disburse basic finance 
to their customers.  
Another initiative to tackle the inadequate Islamic banking network 
is the introduction of ATM services. BMI, for example, is collaborating 
with Bank Central Asia to use that bank‟s 8888 automated teller 
machines (ATMs) for its own customers. Bank Syariah Mandiri (SBM) 
is similar to BMI and has adopted the same strategy. As the largest 
Islamic bank in the country, BSM formed a strategic cooperation with 
its parent company, Bank Mandiri, to allow access to its ATM 
network, allowing BSM customers to use a network which covers 
almost every city in Indonesia. 
Conclusion 
The previous sections have discussed the great impact that SMEs 
have on economic growth. Despite their success, SMEs have difficulty 
in obtaining financing services from the formal financial institutions. 
However, this limitation could be catered to by the existence of BMTs. 
This paper proves that BMTs have an opportunity to cover the SMEs 
business financing service. Apart from their positive contribution, 
BMTs have some deficiencies that need to be managed correctly in 
order to improve their services and develop the performance of the 
SMEs. The issue of coordination amongst other Islamic financial 
institutions is another primary issue that should be seriously 
considered. This issue could be approached by introducing or initiating 
Islamic financial schemes to SME enterprises so that they can uphold a 
strong strategic synergy between the Islamic banking industry and 
national programs.[]  
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